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Abstract 
 
Repeated calls have been made for Council Tax (CT) in the UK to be reformed. A ‘tyranny of 
the status quo’ suggests that politicians will avoid this because they fear a backlash from the 
losers of reform. This paper claims that the tyranny of the status quo is not a fixed law. The 
Welsh government revalued CT in 2005 but did not communicate the complexity of reform 
sufficiently. Reform requires greater efforts to communicate the complexity of winning and 
losing.   
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Introduction 
The ‘tyranny of the status quo’ is commonly seen as an important block for tax reform.  The 
tyranny of the status quo refers to the idea that government tax reforms will usually provoke a 
strong reaction from those that ‘lose’ from the reform but little support from those that ‘win’ 
from reform. This creates a bias where government is reluctant to reform taxes and so sticks 
to the status quo (Cameron and Muellbauer, 2000; Lyons, 2007; Mirrlees et al., 2011a; 
2011b; Johnson and Myles, 2011).  
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A striking example of this tyranny of the status quo is the general failure to reform Council 
Tax (CT) in the UK. CT is the main tax on property in the UK. Properties are placed in one of 
eight CT bands depending on the price of the property relative to other properties. Band A is 
the lowest value property band and band H is the highest value property value band. CT bills 
are expressed as ratios of the band D CT bill. The ratios are expressed in 9ths, which means 
as a fraction of nine. The bill for a band H property is 18/9 (or double) the band D bill. The 
bill for band A property is 6/9 the band D bill. This means that the CT bill for band H is triple 
the CT bill for band A. CT bills also reflect charges for local government services such as 
rubbish collection and so is a hybrid tax combining a tax on property with charges for local 
services (Jones et al., 2006a; 2006b; Lyons, 2007). There is a 25% CT bill reduction for sole 
occupiers and income support through Council Tax Benefit is made available for low income 
groups (Adam and Browne, 2012).  
 
A common idea is to revalue CT to reflect large changes in property prices since CT was first 
introduced (Kenway and Palmer, 1999; Plimmer, 1999; Muellbauer and Cameron, 2000; 
Jones et al., 2006a; 2006b; Lyons, 2007; Mirrlees et al., 2011a; 2011a; European 
Commission, 2014). The tyranny of the status quo seems a key block for reforming CT. 
Mirrlees et al (2011a) note that: ‘any revaluation inevitably creates losers and winners—and 
losers tend to be very vocal. This is one of the most egregious demonstrations of the ‘tyranny 
of the status quo’ as a block to desirable change’ (Mirrlees et al., 2011a, p. 383). 
 
An important exception to the tyranny of the status quo is the Welsh government revaluation 
of CT in 2005. Since devolution, UK government CT policy only applies to England and 
Wales. The Scottish Parliament has the remit for local government finance and Northern 
Ireland has its own system of domestic rates that differ from CT. Up to 2011, the Welsh 
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government was dependent upon the UK government for enabling legislation for CT reform 
in Wales (National Assembly for Wales, 2011). Wales is the only part of the UK that has 
seen a revaluation of CT. This revaluation was introduced on April 1 2005 and is based on 
property values on 1 April 2003. This revaluation updated the existing eight CT bands and 
added a new band I for very high value properties.  
 
How was the Welsh revaluation of CT possible and what lessons does it contain for tax 
reform more generally? This paper claims that the tyranny of the status quo is not a fixed law. 
Government can play a role in shaping this constraint by framing how winners and losers 
from reform are understood. The Welsh government’s 2005 revaluation showed that CT 
reform is possible. However, its failure to communicate the complexity of reform hampered 
efforts to reform CT in 2015.  
 
This paper is organised as follows. The first part outlines the background to CT. The second 
section considers the role of the tyranny of the status quo as a block to reform. The third and 
fourth parts outline the case study method and considers the Welsh government revaluation 
of CT in 2005. This is followed by a discussion and conclusion.  
 
Background 
The failure of the Community Charge or ‘Poll Tax’ provides the immediate background to 
the introduction of CT in the early 1990s. During the 1980s, there was a system of domestic 
rates for UK households which were based on the value of property. Although the rates were 
well understood and fairly easy to collect, the Conservative government was critical of the 
rates because they did not take account of the number of people in a household. This meant 
that sole householders in an expensive property might pay larger rates than a many person 
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household in a cheaper property. Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher saw this as unfair and 
wanted to replace the rates with a tax on persons. The Poll Tax led to mass avoidance and 
public riots in London. The failure of the Poll Tax has been described as one of the largest 
policy blunders by UK government since the end of the Second World War and was a key 
factor in the deposal of Thatcher as Conservative leader (Butler et al., 1994; King and Crewe, 
2014)  
 
CT was introduced as the replacement for the Poll Tax. The aim was not to return to the rates 
and so the CT was based on relative property prices. Repeated calls have been made for the 
reform of CT (Kenway and Palmer, 1999; Plimmer, 1999; Muellbauer and Cameron, 2000; 
Jones et al., 2006a; 2006b; Lyons, 2007; Mirrlees et al., 2011a; 2011b; European 
Commission, 2014). Sir James Mirrlees chaired a recent review of the principles that should 
shape the design of tax systems in the 21st century. This review argues that tax systems 
should be both progressive and neutral. Progressivity means that richer people should pay a 
higher proportion of their income or wealth than poorer people on taxation. This springs from 
a commitment to equality as well as a belief that richer people have a greater capacity to pay 
higher taxes than poorer people. Neutrality means that similar economic activities should be 
taxed similarly. Neutrality is aimed at ensuring an efficient tax system.  
 
Although Mirrlees et al. (2011a; 2011b) outline general tax reforms, this review illustrates 
their ideas by proposing reforms of UK taxation. Mirrlees et al. (2011a; 2011b) argue that 
housing should ideally be taxed as a consumption good. This is because housing provides a 
range of services that people consume (such as shelter or warmth). Mirrlees et al. (2011a) 
propose a Housing Services Tax (HST) to tax housing as a consumption good. They say that 
HST should ideally be set at the same rate as general consumption tax in the UK (that is, 
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Value Added Tax (VAT)). HST would replace CT and other taxes on property in the UK. 
Mirrlees et al (2011a) propose that the HST would be a flat-rate percentage imposed on the 
rental value of the property (this would cover both rented and owner-occupied properties). 
Mirrlees et al. (2011a) estimate that the HST would then be about 12% on the value of 
housing services. They say that this rate was below the (then) level of VAT of 17.5%, but 
there may be scope for increasing the HST over time to approach the VAT rate.     
 
Mirrlees et al. (2011a; 2011b) acknowledge that reforming existing taxes is more likely than 
the implementation of HST. Mirrlees et al. (2011a; 2011b) note that CT is highly regressive 
over property values and so violates their progressivity principle. In England, the threshold 
value for a band H property is £320,000. The upper limit for a band A property is £40,000. 
Thus, the CT bill for a band H property is triple the value for a band A property although the 
value for a band H property is at least eight times the value of a band A property. CT is also 
based on property prices that are over 20 years out of date. There have been large relative 
house price changes and so current CT bands are out of date. Lyons (2007) notes that while 
revaluation might reduce regressivity over property values, this might not have much impact 
of regressivity over income (before income support through Council Tax Benefit is applied). 
This is because there are a class of ‘asset rich, income poor’ people who have lower incomes 
but live in higher value properties. Lyons (2007) notes that these ‘asset rich, income poor’ 
people often include pensioners and form a minority of households. Lyons (2007) adds that 
the presence of such people does not undermine the case for revaluation but highlights that 
the overall effect of revaluation on regressivity is ambiguous.  
 
Mirrlees et al. (2011a; 2011b) adds that CT is inefficient. The 25% discount in CT bills for 
sole occupiers provides incentives for the inefficient use of the existing housing stock by 
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encouraging sole rather than multiple  occupancy. Lack of regular revaluations might also 
contribute to instability in the housing market. Without regular revaluations, CT bills as a 
share of property values fall faster in areas in high property price growth than low property 
price growth. This would then mean that CT would not dampen property price booms 
(Muellbauer and Cameron, 2000; Jones et al. 2006a; 2006b).  Jones et al. (2006a; 2006b) 
simulate the likely effects of a CT revaluation on local government finances and the 
movement of properties between bands. They base their research on data from Scottish local 
authorities. Jones et al. (2006a; 2006b) argue that CT revaluation could have significant 
impact on local government finances and the movement of properties between bands. This is 
because CT bands focus on relative property values rather than being based on the capital 
value of a house. Jones et al. (2006a; 2006b) conclude that CT revaluation would be more 
than ‘rearranging the deckchairs’.  
 
The tyranny of the status quo 
The tyranny of the status quo claims that politicians can expect little thanks from the winners 
from tax reform but a strong backlash from those that lose out. Winners and losers can be 
understood though in different ways. Winners might be seen as those people that make a 
financial gain from a tax change. However, the financial gain might be understood to be the 
gain that arises from a specific tax change or from the wider impact that a particular tax 
change triggers for the whole tax system (for example, a tax rise might allow other taxes to be 
streamlined or cut) (Kaplow, 2011). Alternatively, winning might be associated with the way 
that tax reforms advance certain values. For example, a person might back a rise in the rate of 
income tax even though they are made financially worse off because this leads to a more 
progressive tax system that they support.  This discussion is important because it means that 
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government may have a role in shaping how winners and losers from tax reform are 
understood in public debates.  
 
 
 
The complexity of picking winners and losers may be seen by considering CT revaluation. If 
revaluation occurs, then an obvious set of winners and losers may be those properties that, 
respectively, drop down or rise up the CT bands. However, winners might also include 
properties that stay in the same band. The band that a particular property is placed in after 
revaluation depends on any changes in the property price relative to other property price 
changes. A property may stay in the same CT band if its property price rise is less than the 
rises elsewhere. If the revaluation is not aimed at raising more revenue overall, then the CT 
bill for a property that remains in the same band depends on the number of other properties 
that have changed bands. For example, a case where 50% of properties stay in the same band 
but 25% of properties drop down a band and 25% of properties rise up a band mean that the 
CT bill may be unchanged for a property that stays in the same band. However, the CT bill 
for a property that stays in the same band may rise if 5% of properties rise up a band, 50% of 
properties stay in the same band and 45% of properties drop down a band.  
 
A failure to revalue also creates winners and losers. This is because CT bill for properties 
which experience above average rises in value are lower than they would be after revaluation. 
Properties with little or no rise in property values are in effect subsidising the CT bills of 
properties with high rises (Lyons, 2007; Mirrlees et al., 2011a; 2011b).  
 
Methods 
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Searches were done on Econlit, Social Sciences Citation Index and Social Policy and Practice 
databases to explore the background to CT. The Welsh government’s own website was used 
as key source for official documents on the 2005 CT revaluation. A Freedom of Information 
request was made to the Welsh government for details of minutes and record of meetings of 
the Welsh government’s Council Tax Revaluation Working Group. The Welsh government 
responded to this FOI request and then supplied copies of the agendas and minutes of the 
CTRWG’s meetings. The research also searched for ‘grey’ literature on the Welsh CT 
revaluation on other sites including WalesOnline (http://www.walesonline.co.uk/), Valuation 
Office Agency, Welsh Local Government Association and the main Welsh political parties. 
The Nexis database was used to explore media reaction to the Welsh 2005 CT revaluation.  
 
The case study searched for material from about 2000 onwards. This was before the start of 
the Welsh consultation process on the revaluation and so the research searched for material in 
the run up to this policy. The search was focused mainly on Wales although it gathered 
material relevant that was relevant for the wider UK context. The search terms used to guide 
the data collection included keywords such as Wales Council Tax, revaluation and rebanding 
(as well as alternatives such as reband or reval).   
 
Document analysis was then applied on the collected data. This involved a process of open, 
axial and selective coding. Open coding involved outlining analytical memos that detect 
important themes. For example, one theme flowing from the rhetoric of winners and losers 
focused on the impact of CT reforms on local government finances. This was then used to 
develop corresponding codes (such as revenue neutrality). Axial coding refined the open 
coding by merging codes with similar meanings. Selective coding involved returning to the 
data after the axial coding and analysing this at a higher level of abstraction.  Following 
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recommendations in the methods literature, the codes were first tested on an initial set of 
documents and the codes were then revised (Strauss and Corbin, 1990; Charmaz, 2000; 
Popay et al., 2007). 
 
 
The 2005 CT revaluation in Wales 
The Labour government passed a Local Government Act 2003 which promised a CT 
revaluation in England in 2007 and Wales in 2005. Thereafter, there would be a regular cycle 
of CT revaluations no longer than ten years after the previous revaluation. Although the 
Local Government Act 2003 provided a timetable for regular CT revaluations, successive UK 
ministers postponed a CT revaluation in England. CT revaluations were due in Wales in 2005 
and 2015.  
 
In 2000, the Welsh government published Simplifying the System: local government finance 
in Wales which outlined various options for local finance in Wales. One of the options 
mentioned was a revaluation of CT bands. The aim of such a reform was not to raise more 
money but to make CT more progressive (National Assembly for Wales, 2000). The Welsh 
government followed Simplifying the System: local government finance in Wales up with a 
policy paper in 2002 called Freedom and Responsibility in Local Government. This policy 
paper was developed in discussion with the Welsh Local Government Association (WLGA). 
Freedom and Responsibility in Local Government echoed the importance of having a more 
progressive CT (Welsh government, 2002a).  
 
The Welsh government then set up a Council Tax Revaluation Working Group (CTRWG) to 
advise on the policy options. The CTRWG had members nominated by the Welsh 
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government, WLGA and Valuation Office Agency (VAO). The CTRWG held five meetings 
between May 2002 and October 2002. The work of the CTRWG was to feed into a 
consultation paper to be published by the Welsh government on CT reform (Consultative 
Forum on Finance, 2002).  
 
The remit of the CTRWG states that the aim of reform was not to raise more money for local 
government but to have a more progressive CT (CTRWG, 2002a). The CTRWG was asked to 
consider a transitional relief scheme that would help those properties that moved up bands 
following the revaluation. This attention to transitional relief highlights the concern the 
Welsh government had in helping those properties that faced the prospect of higher bills as 
well as showing special concern with those properties that moved between bands. This 
associates losers also with properties that move between bands. The CTRWG considered 
three main policy choices. First, reallocate properties based on current values within existing 
bands. Modelling requested by the CTRWG showed that this would mean 51% of properties 
would move up at least one band while 38% would stay in the same band. Second, revaluing 
CT bands. Initial research suggested that this would mean little change to the overall taxbase 
and 21% of properties moving up at least one band. Third, revaluing bands and adding new 
bands. This considered a new band A- at the bottom of the scale and a band H+ at the top of 
the scale. The CTRWG also considered the effects of varying the proportions attached to CT 
bands from 9ths to 8ths, 10ths or 15ths (CTRWG, 2002a; 2002b; 2002c). Early predictions 
suggested that about a fifth of properties would move up bands by revaluing CT.  
 
On 19 December 2002 the Welsh government published a first consultation on its plans to 
reform CT. This consultation outlined two main ideas for discussion. First, revalue the 
existing bands and add a new band I at the top of the scale. Second, to consider moving from 
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a system of 9ths to 8ths to support progressive reform (Welsh government, 2002b). Welsh 
government (2004b) notes that 66% of responses backed a new band I and 45% preferred to 
stay with a system of ninths (with 23% preferring a move to eighths and 31% not expressing 
a preference) (Welsh government 2004a).  
 
A second consultation document was published in June 2003. This supplementary 
consultation said that the Welsh government had decided not to move to a system of 8ths as 
this would have meant many taxpayers having to pay more money. Although a move to 8ths 
would improve the progressive nature of CT, the Welsh government anticipated that this 
move would mean higher CT bills for many people and so create many losers from reform. 
The Welsh government was concerned with avoiding this and so ruled out a move to 8ths. A 
revalued set of CT bands were set out in the first consultation. There would be a new band I. 
The bands were set at 50% of the difference between the average sale values. However, the 
Welsh government revised the values for the CT bands and because of this wanted to have a 
supplementary consultation on the revised CT bands (Welsh government, 2003).  
 
The proposals set out in the second consultation document were broadly supported by county 
councils and the WLGA although there were also calls for relief to be provided to help people 
and councils cope with a change to a new system. One of the Welsh government’s key 
partners therefore was also concerned with the potential losers from reform and wanted 
policies in place to cushion rises in CT bills (Welsh government, 2004a).   
 
The VOA was responsible for revaluing properties as part of the reform. This involved 
revaluing about 1.3 million properties and placing these in the new bands. Initial work on 
placing properties to the bands began in April 2003 and the process ended in June 2004. The 
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VOA drew up lists based on property values on 1 April 2003  (Valuation Office Agency, 
2005)  Official data shows that prior to revaluation, CT revenue raised £924.1 million in 
2004-05 and after revaluation it raised £1,012 million. A Welsh government note to the 
Office of the Deputy Prime Minister noted that the average taxbase rose by 5.4% following 
the revaluation. About 1% of this was attributed to the normal growth of the taxbase and 
4.4% to the effects of the revaluation (Welsh government, 2005a).  
 
Effects of the 2005 revaluation 
Tables 1 and 2 below show the effects of the 2005 revaluation on the numbers of properties 
in the different bands. Table 1 reports the CT bands before and after the revaluation and 
Table 2 shows the numbers of properties in Wales in the different CT bands before and after 
the revaluation. The second column of Table 2 shows the number of properties in each band 
after the inflows and outflows of properties following revaluation. The inflows (and 
outflows) are made up of properties that have either risen or fallen from other bands. The mix 
of inflows and outflows differs for different bands.  
 
[Insert Tables 1 and 2 here] 
 
The Welsh government (2005b) estimated that the majority of properties would either stay in 
the same band or drop bands following revaluation. It estimated that 50% of properties would 
stay in the same band, 25% of properties would drop down the bands and 25% of properties 
would rise up the bands. Following the revaluation, more properties than expected rose up 
bands and fewer properties than expected dropped down bands. Less than a quarter of the 
expected number of properties dropped down the bands and there were four times as many 
properties that rose bands as those properties that fell down bands. 773,310 out of 1,317,450 
13 
 
properties stayed in the same band following the revaluation. This means that about 59% of 
all properties stayed in the same band. 438,760 properties moved up at least one band 
following the revaluation, which is about 33% of all properties (Valuation Office Agency, 
2015). Around 8% of properties went down by at least band. 63,261 properties went up by 2 
bands or more and this is about 5% of the total properties in Wales (Welsh government, 
2005b).  
 
Following the revaluation, the average band D CT bill rose from £887 in 2004-5 to £921 in 
2005-06. This meant an average rise of £34 for properties that remained in band D. There was 
then a 3.8% rise in average CT bills for a band D property following the revaluation. This rise 
was in fact the lowest annual percentage rise in CT bills for band D properties since CT was 
first introduced. For example, the 3.8% rise in 2005-06 compared with 6% in 2004-05 and 
4.5% in 2006-07 (StatsWales, 2016).    
 
 
Reaction to the 2005 revaluation 
This gap between expectations and reality mattered because it shaped the public and political 
reaction to the 2005 revaluation. Debates about revaluation were dominated by focusing on 
properties that moved bands and this had an effect on a further revaluation for Wales in 2015. 
Nick Bourne the leader of the Conservatives in the Welsh Assembly stated that: ‘Less than 
one in 10 households will benefit from going down a council tax band whereas more than a 
third will go up at least one band’ (reported in BBC News, 2005).   The Chair of the WLGA 
Alex Alridge voiced similar concerns about the proportions of households moving up at least 
one band (Parry, 2005). Media coverage also described households that moved up bands as 
losers from reform. There was little discussion of those people who were possible winners 
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either by dropping down bands or staying in the same band (Niffield, 2005; Isaacs, 2005; 
Western Mail, 2005).   
 
The Welsh government responded to the worries over the revaluation by running a 
consultation in 2004 on a transitional relief scheme aimed at protecting households that 
moved up bands following the revaluation (Welsh government, 2004c). Following this 
consultation, a transitional relief scheme was implemented which meant that no household 
could move up more than one band a year (Parry, 2005). On November 2 2004 the Minister 
for Finance, Local Government and Public Services Sue Essex (2004) announced that she 
was providing an extra £11 million for local government in 2005-06 to help fund the 
transitional relief scheme (Essex, 2004). Welsh government (2005a) records that the 
transitional relief scheme would run for three years.  
 
Failed CT revaluation in 2015 
The skewed nature of public debates over the CT revaluation was important as this seemed 
then to shape the fate of planned revaluations in England and Wales. On 3 December 2010, 
the UK Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government Eric Pickles announced 
that he was ruling out any CT revaluation in England during the 2010-2015 Parliament 
because he was concerned about the impact of CT rises on family budgets. In doing so he 
criticised the 2005 Welsh revaluation and argued that four times as many properties moved 
up bands than down (Department for Communities and Local Government, 2010).  
 
Critics of the Welsh government alleged that Wales was a guinea pig for a potential CT 
revaluation in England. The critics argued that the UK government learnt from the ‘mistakes’ 
made during the 2005 revaluation. These mistakes included underestimating the losers from 
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reform (Western Mail, 2005). In Wales, opposition politicians called for the planned CT 
revaluation in 2015 to be abandoned (Millar 2010). On 9 December 2010, the Labour First 
Minister of Wales Carwyn Jones and Plaid Cymru Deputy Prime Minister Ieuen Wyn Jones 
reported that they had asked the UK government to amend the Local Government Act 2003 
to cancel the legal requirement to have the revaluation in 2015. Carwyn Jones cites UK 
government cuts on the Welsh government budget as a key reason why the Welsh 
government asked to be free of the need to revalue CT. He added that the estimated £5 
million costs of a revaluation exercise would be better on protecting frontline services 
(reported in Williamson, 2009). 
 
Discussion 
This paper suggests that the tyranny of the status quo is not a fixed constraint on government 
trying to reform taxes. This paper claims that government can create space for tax reform by 
framing how the winners and losers from reform are understood.  
 
What does the Welsh government revaluation of CT show about this claim? During the 
revaluation process, the Welsh government paid attention to the winners and losers from 
reform. The Welsh government ruled out a shift from 9ths to 8ths that would have improved 
the progressivity of CT as this would have increased the losers from reform. Its transitional 
relief scheme was also aimed at cushioning the impact on the CT bills of properties that rose 
bands.  
 
Nevertheless, a major limitation is that the Welsh government did not convey the complexity 
of reform adequately. The Welsh government devoted little attention to explaining or 
informing the public how the winners from revaluation might also include properties that 
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stayed in the same band after revaluation. Nearly three fifths of properties stayed in the same 
band after revaluation. Those properties that stayed in the same band might also be seen as 
winners. This is because their CT bills were arguably lower than they would have been with 
no revaluation.  
 
The failure to communicate the complexity of reform meant that the Welsh government was 
put on the defensive in debates after the revaluation. Debates focused on the mismatch 
between the expectations and reality of those properties that moved between bands after the 
revaluation. It was easy for critics to portray the CT revaluation as a failed exercise. These 
worries were not confined to the critics of reform but also to its erstwhile supporters. The 
WLGA was one of the key backers of reform of CT and was involved in the reform process 
by taking part in the CTRWG. However, the WLGA voiced concern over the impact of 
revaluation on the movement of properties between bands. This skewed debates about CT 
reform in 2015.  
 
Perhaps the main lesson from the Welsh CT revaluation in 2005 is that government should 
take an active role in shaping how the winners and losers from reform are understood. Part of 
this may focus on highlighting the complexity of tax reform typically involves a varied set of 
winners and losers. Doing this might help rebut the arguments of critics that seek to present 
winners and losers in a particular way. Government might also place more weight in 
developing arguments that challenge the framework of the tyranny of the status quo as well 
as highlighting the complexities involved in using such a framework. The Welsh government 
did refer to arguments about fairness when outlining the case for reform in 2005. However, 
these arguments were dominated by a concern the Welsh government had with minimising 
the losers from reform.  
17 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
A general reluctance by government to make the case for reform is perhaps one of the reasons 
why CT has been unreformed for so long. The Welsh government revaluation in 2005 is an 
exception to this trend. Yet, while the Welsh government engaged with a calculus of winners 
and losers during the policy process it did not communicate the complexity of reform enough 
to the public. Admittedly, explaining that winners might include those properties that remain 
in the same band after reform might be a harder task than focusing simply on properties that 
drop bands. However, tax reform is often complex and so public communication means 
government engaging with complex arguments. The failure of the Welsh government to 
embark on this task hampered the 2015 CT revaluation. The fact that the Welsh government 
managed to revalue CT in 2005 shows that reform is possible. The task now for government 
to reform CT is to engage with the public more thoroughly on the complexity of tax reform.  
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Table 1: CT bands in Wales  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sources: Welsh government, 2004a; 
http://www.voa.gov.uk/corporate/CouncilTax/howYourHomeIsbanded.html#bands, accessed 
18/8/2014 
 
 
Table 2: Number of properties in different CT bands in Wales 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Valuation Office Agency, (2015) 
 
CT band 
CT 
Property values £, 
Wales, (1993) 
Property values £ 
Wales, (2005)                                                                                
A Under 30,000 Under 44,000 
B 30,001 to 39,000 44,001 to 65,000 
C 39,001 to 51,000 65,001 to 91,000 
D 50,001 to 66,000 91,001 to 123,000 
E 66,001 to 90,000 123,001 to 162,000 
F 90,001 to 120,000 162,001 to 223,000 
G 120,001 to 240,000 223,001 to 324,000 
H 240,001 and above 324,001 to 424,001 
I N/A 424,001 and above 
CT band 
CT 
      1993 list       2005 list                                                                               
A 255,840 199,480 
B 325,900 284,490 
C 265,000 289,030 
D 200,520 206,120 
E 164,120 168,260 
F 64,450 103,280 
G 38,250 49,190 
H 3,390 12,050 
I N/A 5,550 
